Stephen John Currier v. Tamara Holden : Response to Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Stephen John Currier v. Tamara Holden : Response
to Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Annina M. Mitchell; Angela F. Micklos; James Beadles; Utah Attorney General's Office;
Attorneys for Appellee.
Kathryn D. Kendell; Steven Aeschbacher; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Currier v. Holden, No. 920467 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4436
IM THE UTAH POTTRT OF APPEALS 
I^H bl 
STEPHEN CURRIER, 
'"'»
t:4" i t i o n e j . di*~ A p p e l l a n t , 
TAMARA HOLDENr WARDEN, 
liespondp.i11" and A p p e l l e e . 
C a s e No, ,)^u4b;-L lj 
Priority No. & 3 
CARL McCLELLAN, 
P e t i t i oi ler ai id A p p e i i a n t , 
v . 
TAMARA HQL1 l\N , 
R e s p O l l "M!" i , i " |)()( « I i » i 
Case No. 930123-CA 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT1-^ PETITION FOR REHEARING 
JAN GRAHAM (1231} 
Utah Attorney General 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (2274) 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (62 29) 
JAMES BEADLES (52 50) 
Assistant Attorneys; neneral 
130 State Capito: 
Salt Lake City, UT S4±JL<± 
KATHftYN I), K ENDELL ; c: '\ 98 ) 
Attorney f or • "\; i: r ier 
American Civil Libei* ei Union 
9 Exchange Place, #7 1'.. 
Salt Lake City, UT "4 1 
STEVEN AESCHBACHER (4527) 
Attorney for McClellan 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
7 9 South Main. #400 
Salt Lake C: t,v T 4 1 ; ~ 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 2 6 m 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN CURRIER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, WARDEN, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 920467-CA 
CARL McCLELLAN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 930123-CA 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (2274) 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
JAMES BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
KATHRYN D. KENDELL (5398) 
Attorney for Currier 
American Civil Liberties Union 
9 Exchange Place, #715 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
STEVEN AESCHBACHER (4527) 
Attorney for McClellan 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES il 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT, HAVING FAILED ON APPEAL TO RAISE THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED IN HER PETITION FOR REHEARING 
HAS WAIVED HER RIGHT TO RAISE THESE ISSUES 1 
II. THIS COURT HAS THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DECLARE 
A STATE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
III. THIS COURT WAS MANIFESTLY CORRECT IN CONCLUDING 
THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
PROVIDED PETITIONER A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
REMEDY FOR CHALLENGING THE LEGALITY OF HIS 
CONVICTION 
IV. BECAUSE ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 PROVIDES PETITIONER 
A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED REMEDY THIS COURT 
WAS CORRECT IN REQUIRING RESPONDENT TO DEMONSTRATE 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF §78-12-31.1 
CONCLUSION. 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) 7 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989) 8 
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) 3,4,7 
In re Petition of Runyan. 121 Wash. 2d 432, 
852 P.2d 424 (1993) 5,6 
Potts v. State. 833 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. 1992) 6 
Thompson v. Harris. 106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 (1943). . . . 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) 1,2,5, 
7,8 
Utah Const, art. I, § 5 3,7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 8 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 2 2,3 
Utah R. Civ. P. 35 2 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN CURRIER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, WARDEN, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 920467-CA 
CARL McCLELLAN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 930123-CA 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent seeks a rehearing on this court's opinion 
invalidating § 78-12-31.1. Respondent's petition raises three 
entirely new arguments. Raising these arguments at this point is 
improper, and abusive of the rehearing process. Moreover, 
respondent's arguments are unfounded and unsupported by Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT, HAVING FAILED ON APPEAL TO RAISE THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED IN HER PETITION FOR REHEARING HAS WAIVED HER RIGHT 
TO RAISE THESE ISSUES. 
In her Petition for Rehearing, respondent, for the first 
time raises three points in support of her view that this court's 
decision was incorrect. None of the arguments raised by 
respondent were raised on appeal before this court, either in 
briefs or at oral argument. At no time did respondent challenge 
or question this court's authority to determine the 
constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1. Presumably, respondent is 
displeased with this court's holding that the restrictive statute 
of limitations set forth in § 78-12-31.1 renders it 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, respondent was put on notice 
that the constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1 was being challenged 
and that this court was the forum to which the constitutional 
challenge was presented. Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides that a rehearing may be sought when a party 
believes the court "overlooked" or "misapprehended" the argument 
presented on appeal. Implicit in the Rule is the requirement 
that a Petition for Rehearing seek court review of arguments 
presented below when there is a good faith basis for believing 
the argument was not fully or clearly understood by the court. 
Respondent subverts the policy underlying a Petition for 
Rehearing by asking the court to consider new arguments after 
failing to convince this court of the correctness of her original 
position. Allowing respondent to raise new arguments at 
rehearing amounts essentially to a grant of an entirely new 
hearing, not merely a rehearing of the issues which were 
addressed and correctly understood by this court. 
II. THIS COURT HAS THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DECLARE A STATE 
LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Respondent invokes Article VIII, section 2 of the Utah 
2 
Constitution in support of her view that only the Utah State 
Supreme Court can declare state laws unconstitutional. However, 
Article VIII, section 2 was codified years prior to the creation 
of this court. Moreover, the jurisdiction of this court, set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 includes "appeals from orders 
on petitions for extraordinary relief sought by persons who are 
incarcerated . . . ". Petitioner properly sought review from 
this court of the dismissal of his writ by the trial court based 
on his failure to file within the 90-day time period. 
III. THIS COURT WAS MANIFESTLY CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 5 OP THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PROVIDED PETITIONER A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED REMEDY FOR CHALLENGING THE 
LEGALITY OF HIS CONVICTION. 
a. The remedy of writ of habeas corpus is not limited 
to jurisdictional challenges. 
Respondent scolds this court for it's conclusion that 
Article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides appellant 
the right to collaterally attack his conviction by way of a 
Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus. In support of this claim, 
respondent relies on turn-of-the-century case law. Respondent 
also refers to the Utah Supreme Court case of Hurst v. Cook, 777 
P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) as supporting the proposition that writs of 
habeas corpus were limited to challenging only jurisdiction. 
Even a cursory reading of Hurst demonstrates that it stands first 
and foremost for the proposition that "habeas corpus has become a 
procedure for assuring that one is not deprived of life or 
liberty in derogation of a constitutional right, irrespective of 
whether the error was categorized as jurisdictional or non-
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jurisdictional." Id. at 1034. The Hurst opinion is laden with 
language highlighting the significant importance of the writ of 
habeas corpus to American constitutional protections. "[T]he 
writ of habeas corpus is one of the most important of all 
judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty." Id. 
The Hurst opinion makes abundantly clear that in Utah, post-
conviction relief and the writ of habeas corpus1 are not separate 
procedures, but rather "the writ of habeas corpus has, over the 
years, absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a 
single constitutional remedy." Id. at 1033. 
The import of the Hurst opinion could not be more clear: 
"The function of a writ of habeas corpus as ci post-conviction 
remedy is to provide a means for collaterally attacking 
convictions when they are so constitutionally flawed that they 
result in fundamental unfairness and to provide for collateral 
attack of sentences not authorized by law." Id. at 1035. 
Respondent's citing to Hurst for the proposition that writs of 
habeas corpus are limited to challenging jurisdiction borders on 
misrepresentation. Moreover, the Hurst opinion cited as 
precedent Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 (1943) 
which recognized that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be 
regarded woodenly, but rather, that this "precious safeguard of 
personal liberty" should not be limited to only jurisdictional 
questions. Id. at 766. 
The inanity of respondent's restrictive interpretation of 
the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus remedy is demonstrated 
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by application of her analysis to § 78-12-31.1. If in fact the 
statute of limitations embodied in that section is interpreted as 
respondent now suggests, then the 90-day limitation period would 
only apply to those writs based on jurisdictional challenges and 
not to post-conviction relief or petitions misidentified as writs 
of habeas corpus which challenge convictions on bases other than 
jurisdiction. Certainly, given the legislative debate 
surrounding § 78-12-31.1, it cannot legitimately be argued that 
the legislature intended anything other than application of the 
limitations period to all post-conviction writs and not to those 
which challenged only jurisdiction. Respondent's argument falls 
flat in the face of clearly delineated legislative intent and 
purpose. 
b. Section 78-12-31.1 is so restrictive as to amount 
to suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 
violation of Article I, section 5. 
Respondent relies on the authority of two out-of-state cases 
in arguing that § 78-12-31.1 does not violate Utah's anti-
suspension clause. Both of these cases are so factually and 
analytically inapposite as to provide virtually no support for 
respondent's assertion. In In Re Petition of Runyan, 121 Wash. 
2d 432, 853 P.2d 424 (1993) the Washington Supreme Court 
addressed a challenge to a one-year statute of limitations for 
post-conviction, collateral relief. Petitioners in Runyan were 
arguing that this time limit suspended the writ of habeas corpus 
in violation of the Washington Constitution. The challenged 
statute in Washington was not limited to writs of habeas corpus, 
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but applied to all post-conviction petitions. The Court, in 
upholding the limitations provision noted throughout its opinion 
that the challenged statute provided for numerous safeguards. 
Also noteworthy to the Court was the fact that the statute 
contained numerous exceptions, including, the discovery of new 
evidence or convictions obtained with insufficient evidence. Id. 
at 431. In fact, the Runyan court specifically stated that "a 
strict statute of limitations on all habeas petitions would be a 
derogation of the common law writ of habeas corpus and hence, an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ." Id. 
What this court was faced with on appeal was the definitive 
strict statute of limitations on all habeas petitions, not the 
relaxed and broadly exemptive provision challenged in Washington. 
Moreover, as respondent neglects to note, the statute challenged 
in Washington was a one-year statute of limitations as opposed to 
the strikingly restrictive 90-day statute which this court 
legitimately invalidated. 
In Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1992), also relied 
on by respondent, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed 
petitioner's challenge to a three-year statute of limitations for 
post-conviction relief. Again, the statute challenged in 
Tennessee addressed petitions for post-conviction relief and not 
specifically writs of habeas corpus. This critical distinction 
is ignored by respondent. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that 
the statute of limitations on the filing of post-conviction 
petitions was inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings. The 
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Court went on to note a theoretical and statutory distinction in 
Tennessee between writs of habeas corpus and post-conviction 
petitions. This distinction was explicitly rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hurst. The Tennessee court said that the 
statute of limitations provision would not effect the filing of 
writs of habeas corpus except to the extent that the habeas 
petitions were properly treated by courts as post-conviction 
petitions. "Habeas corpus has no statutory time limit." Id. at 
62. Again, it is worth noting that the statute challenged in 
Tennessee was a comparatively generous three-year statute of 
limitations. 
Unlike the Washington and Tennessee statutes, the Utah 
statute of limitations specifically names and singles out for 
limitation all writs of habeas corpus. The statute was meant to 
apply to all writs collaterally attacking a conviction. The 
breadth and scope of the statute coupled with a lack of any 
safeguards violates the anti-suspension clause of our State 
Constitution. An analysis of the cases relied on by respondent 
demonstrates the correctness of this conclusion. 
IV. BECAUSE ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 PROVIDES PETITIONER WITH A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED REMEDY, THIS COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
REQUIRING RESPONDENT TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
§ 78-12-31.1. 
Because this court correctly concluded that Article I, 
section 5 gave appellant a constitutionally guaranteed civil 
remedy protected from infringement by Article I, section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution, application of the two-part test set out 
in Berry ex rel. Berry v, Beech Aircraft Corp,, 717 P.2d 670 
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(Utah 1985) was entirely correct. Of course, respondent asserts 
she was not required to defend the constitutionality of § 78-12-
31.1 and makes no defense of the constitutionality of that 
statute in her petition. However, because the writ of habeas 
corpus is considered a post-conviction remedy entitled to Article 
I, section 11 protection, this court conducted the analysis 
required by Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989) . Respondent simply refuses to assume her burden. 
Respondent's position is understandable, the statute is 
indefensible. Unfortunately, rather than conceding the manifest 
unconstitutionality of the 90-day limitation, respondent 
unjustifiably seeks rehearing, further delaying petitioner a 
right to be heard by the trial court on the merits of his writ. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing is without merit. 
Presenting new arguments for this court's consideration at 
rehearing is improper. This court is specifically granted 
authority to review petitioner's appeal. This court was correct 
in finding that the writ of habeas corpus remedy in Utah is 
regarded as a significant constitutional protection. The severe 
limitation placed on this remedy by § 78-12-31.1 amounts to 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of Article 
I, section 5. Respondent has failed to convince this court of 
the constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1 as required when this court 
finds a violation of Article I, section 11. This court's opinion 
striking down the 90-day statute of limitations was correct and 
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fully supported by Utah law. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing 
should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 2k ry^ day of October, 1993. 
KATHRYN DV KENDELL (5098) 
Attorney for Currier 
American Civil Liberties Union 
9 Exchange Place, #715 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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